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ABSTRACT
To put Scandinavian employment in perspective, we ask whether wage compression hampers 
employment rates, or not. We answer by reviewing the most important theoretical arguments and 
the most informative regularities across countries with different wage distributions. The pattern 
seems to be that countries with compressed wage distributions tend to have higher employment, 
and countries with higher wage inequality tend to have lower employment. This also holds when we 
consider the rate of labor force participation. In line with the theoretical arguments, coordination 
in wage bargaining seems to contribute to both employment expansion and wage compression. 
There is a clear positive correlation between coordination and employment even when we control 
for inequality, country, and year-specific effects. 
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Introduction
Equality has both costs and benefits, but there is no agreement on the relative impor-tance of each. Employment is a case in point. Skeptics claim that more wage equal-ity reduces employment by excluding low-productivity workers from employment, 
which in turn should be considered a high price for equality. Proponents, in contrast, 
claim that more wage equality, if anything, raises employment by incorporating indirect 
negative effects in wage setting, implying an employment prize of equality.
Who is right? The answer is of some importance as wages are distributed rather 
differently in many countries. Figure 1 shows the differences in wage dispersion across 
countries in 2007. Together with Belgium and Finland, the Scandinavian countries dis-
play the most compressed wage structures of all, no matter whether we measure it by 
the ninth decile to the first (d9d1) or by the median wage relative to the first decile 
(d5d1).
To see how wage differences like these may affect employment, we first discuss 
some possible theoretical mechanisms, arguing that the two views on wage equality and 
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employment might be related to different institutional settings. It is essential how wage 
compression comes about: whether it is one-sided or two-sided, from below or from 
below and above. It is also important to account for the presence of employers’ mon-
opsony power and whether the wage equality is implemented by unions or by law. Both 
wage setting systems and welfare state policies can simultaneously affect wage inequal-
ity and the supply and demand of labor. 
To have a fair battle of theories, one has to get the details right. One decisive detail 
needs to be considered upfront in order to have a case to discuss: Are wage differentials 
basically compressed in some countries because the skills distribution is compressed? If 
that is what we observe, we cannot learn much about the role of wage differentials by 
comparing countries with different wage distributions – as we do below. There is clear 
evidence, however, that wage differentials differ across countries, also for a given distri-
bution of observable skills, and even after controlling for the distribution of results on 
cognitive test scores (Blau and Kahn 2005). 
Thus we can use variations across countries and over time to shed light on the role 
of wage differentials. Yet, we have to recognize the well-known limitations of this kind 
of analysis as countries differ in many other dimensions in addition to their levels of 
wage inequality. We can account for some of this heterogeneity by including country-
specific effects capturing country size, history, institutions, local culture, etc. By doing 
this, we explore how the variations within each country differ across countries. In this 
first cut our empirical ambitions are therefore modest. 
We think of the regressions that we provide as an efficient way of describing the 
empirical pattern across countries where certain patterns may help us exclude some pos-
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d5d1 shows median gross earnings relative to the first decile. d9d1 shows the ninth decile gross earnings relative to the 
first decile. 
Source: OECD iLibrary.
Figure 1: Relative wages, OECD countries 2007.
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wage compression and employment only as an indication that there might be a costly 
employment price to be paid. Similarly, we consider a positive correlation to be an in-
dication that there is a beneficial employment prize to be obtained. We deliberately use 
the word indication as we would have to dig deeper in order to establish clear causal 
relationships.
The battle of theories of employment
To find out how wage compression affects employment, we need to understand how wage 
compression comes about. Both skeptics and proponents of wage equality would agree 
that wage setting systems, union structure, and welfare state arrangements are important, 
even though they tend to disagree on the partial and overall effects of each factor.
The two views in different settings 
The simplest case for how wage equality may reduce employment is straightforward 
and convincing. It captures the effects of raising the lowest wages and represents wage 
compression from below. 
One-side wage compression from below
In general, 
i)  a high minimum pay requires sufficiently high local productivity for the jobs to be 
profitable. 
Thus, wage compression that raises the lowest wages normally destructs low-productiv-
ity jobs as they become economically obsolete. As a consequence, low-qualified persons 
can be excluded from the employed labor force simply because there is no employer who 
can profitably employ them. High minimum wages for everybody can in other words 
make low-qualified persons unemployable. 
A simple version of the argument, consistent with the skeptical view on wage compres-
sion, might be expressed as follows: The demand for a specific type of low-qualified workers 
depends on the wage costs for that type of workers – unions raise these wage costs as does a 
generous welfare state policy; and employment is declining in wage costs, unionization, and 
the welfare generosity. Wage compression is therefore associated with low employment. 
Full employment for all types of workers requires a market-based wage flexibility associ-
ated with decentralized wage setting, and a not too generous welfare spending.
Compression with monopsony power
The clear conclusion that wage compression hampers employment may not stand up 
once we include the possibility that employers may exercise monopsony power in the 
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labor market. Recently, the role of monopsony power has been taken more seriously by 
several leading researchers. It can be particularly important for low-paid groups. Yet, 
monopsony should not be taken literally as the result of having only one single employer 
as the local buyer of labor services. Monopsony power may also be a natural result from 
search frictions that limit the short run mobility among workers across firms and sec-
tors (Card and Krueger 1995, Manning 2003). Wages become sensitive to local labor 
demand. With search frictions affecting the flows in the labor market, employers may 
find it profitable to restrict their demand for labor in order to reduce the wage.
Exploiting the monopsony power, the gains to the employer are just the wage re-
ductions, and the costs are the loss of revenue due to lower employment. The strategy 
is therefore most profitable in low-productivity jobs where the costs of trying to lower 
wages are lowest. How much the demand for labor is restricted depends on how sensi-
tive wages are to lower demand and how productive the jobs are. 
Accordingly, 
ii)  monopsony power among employers implies that less employment is associated 
with lower, not higher, wages – and all else being the same employment is held back 
more in low-productivity jobs than in high-productivity jobs. 
With monopsony, the introduction of minimum wages reduces wage inequality by 
raising the lowest wages at the same time as employment goes up, as employers can-
not benefit from reducing their employment below the level that equates marginal 
productivity to the unit cost of labor.  As stated, a partial increase of minimum wages 
generates both higher equality in the wage distribution and a higher mean wage. Yet, 
the implications are clear. The effects of a higher minimum wage, either set by unions 
or in other ways, would show up as a negative correlation between employment and 
wage inequality. 
Two-sided wage compression
In order to isolate the impacts of wage equality per se, we should focus on two-sided 
wage compression, i.e., compression from above and from below, allowing for the 
case of more wage equality for a given mean. In addition, it is important to note that 
two-sided wage compression has been a pronounced feature of Scandinavian wage 
policies after World War II. In particular, it is a distinct feature of the so-called soli-
darity negotiations that became institutionalized in the end of the 1950s in Sweden 
and Norway.
Some proponents of wage compression build their arguments on two-sided com-
pression, abstracting from monopsony power considerations. An equally simple ver-
sion of their arguments, as the one we used for the skeptics, might be expressed as 
follows: 
Mean preserving wage compression consists not only of raising the lowest wages, 
but also of moderating the highest ones. The partial effect of wage moderation at the 
top is to raise the profitability of firms, inducing further investments in new plants and 
equipment, stimulating employment and making it possible to raise the lowest wages 
without increasing unemployment (Moene and Wallerstein, 1997).
 Nordic journal of working life studies Volume 2  ❚  Number 2  ❚  May 2012 9
Wage compression can in this manner reduce non-competitive wage differentials across 
plants, also for workers of the same skills. By cutting the level of rent sharing, the elimi-
nation of non-competitive wage differentials stimulates investment in new technology. 
Technologically advanced and high-paying firms may as a result pay lower wages, while 
low-productivity and low-paying firms have to pay higher wages, compared with a situ-
ation without wage compression. In short, 
iii)  two-sided wage compression fuels a positive structural change – low-productivity 
jobs are destructed and high-productivity jobs are created.
Hence, two-sided wage compression does not only reduce the ability of low-produc-
tive firms to remain in business with their old technology but also increase the ability 
to establish more high-productivity jobs. It simply speeds up the process of creative 
destruction, leading to a new path where the gap between the most and the least pro-
ductive plants becomes smaller. 
In sum, wage restraints at the top imply that the wage of the least qualified workers 
can be raised without reducing their employment. Accounting for how the employment 
of each type of workers may depend on the wages to all types of workers employed, 
wage equality is therefore not associated with declining, but rather with expanding 
employment rates. 
If this sketch is a fair representation of the core mechanism in the two views, the 
controversy boils down to what unions actually do when they compress wages. 
What do unions do? 
Are unions compressing the wage structure only by raising the bottom wages? Or, are 
unions compressing the wage structure from both the top and the bottom? How does 
the presence of unions affect monopsony power of employers? And, how does the sys-
tem or level of coordination of wage setting affect wage compression by unions?
Unfortunately, there is no theoretical consensus on what unions actually do, not to 
mention what unions maximize, if anything. Overviews are provided by, for instance, 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) and Moene et al. (1993). There is neither a consensus 
about what the typical wage contract covers. Is it just the wage levels, or both wages 
and employment levels? In the following discussion, we apply a convention favoring the 
skeptical view on wage compression. 
We think of unions as quasi-democratic institutions that care about their members’ 
real wages and employment levels. In short, unions care about both pay and jobs. In 
addition, we think of the wage contract as an agreement that covers only wages, leaving 
the right to manage employment levels to the employers. 
Each union balances its assessment of the raise in material well-being that a higher 
wage level would generate, against the reduction in well-being of others who might lose 
their jobs at a higher wage level. In this calculation, the material well-being is measured 
by the consumer real wage, reflecting the material well-being workers can acquire by 
their nominal wages (nominal wages divided by the consumer price index). The gain of a 
wage increase, measured in this way, must be traded-off against the direct – and perhaps 
also the indirect – job loss. 
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Direct and indirect job losses 
The rise in the product real wage (the nominal wages divided by the relevant prices that 
employers obtain in output markets) may imply job losses – as principle (i) applies. As 
employers to some extent can pass on wage increases to the prices they charge in ac-
cordance with their market power, the product real wage may increase less than the con-
sumer real wage. What we denote the effective monopoly power of the union measures 
the ability of the union to raise its consumer real wage without a proportional increase 
in its product real wage. A high ability to limit the rise in the product real wage also 
limits the direct job loss, the punishment for higher wages. 
Jobs can also be lost if higher wages reduce profits and in turn profit-induced invest-
ments, with detrimental effects on the creation of new jobs. Declining investments may 
affect the demand for all types of workers, not only the particular workers whose wage 
is changed.
The effective monopoly power and indirect job losses constitute important exter-
nalities in wage setting. Hence, higher wages to one group may influence the employ-
ment of all groups of workers. When all unions raise their wages by say ten percent, 
the consumer real wage goes up with ten percent, even though all unions may calcu-
late with a much lower impact from their own wage increase. The indirect job loss is 
another source of externality. A wage increase may hamper the demand for other types 
of workers via lower profit-induced investments. 
Faced with externalities that arise via real wages and employment levels, each union 
leader is similar to a car owner in the rush hour who, deciding whether to drive or not, 
only considers his own expected time in the traffic jam and disregards how his driving 
contributes to the total traffic jam. Just as each car driver has reasons to neglect that it 
is the total car driving by all drivers that actually makes the traffic jam, each union has 
reasons to disregard the total impacts of higher wage demands by all unions. 
Unions, monopsony, and fairness 
To find the impact of unions and wage coordination, we also have to return to the 
possibility that employers can exercise monopsony power. Employers are restricted in 
their exercise of monopsony power when they face a local union that represents the 
collective interests of the local workforce, making it less profitable to restrict employ-
ment. Thus, union wage setting might have similar implications to an exogenously set 
minimum pay. The employers cannot gain as much as before by reducing his employ-
ment levels in the hope of raising profits by reducing the equilibrium wage – just as 
principle (ii) implies. 
In addition, unionization means a change in how the relative wages are determined 
among union members. Collective bargaining means that each union now bargains on 
behalf of all its members who might have different earning capacities. Collective bar-
gaining means that some worker–employer bargaining is replaced by worker–worker 
arguing. Hence, it becomes more difficult to utilize the same type of industrial actions in 
worker–worker encounters as in worker–employer encounters. 
Most likely notions of fairness, such as “equal wage for equal work,” receive a more 
prominent place in the determination of relative wages as the ability to apply brute 
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bargaining force declines. As the incidence of collective bargaining increases, the pos-
sibility of employers to reward individual workers declines. Thus, employers’ ability to 
discriminate between similar workers, who nevertheless may have different productiv-
ity, may vanish. Wages have to reflect some kind of average productivity and collective 
bargaining would thus almost by definition represent an implicit two-sided compression 
from below and above – in accordance with principle (iii). 
Yet, since this compression takes place within the bargaining unit, there might be 
differences across countries that stem from variations of the size and composition of 
bargaining units between countries. These variations of the size and composition of 
bargaining units depend on the level of wage coordination.
Bargaining coordination 
Wages can be coordinated within each company or firm only, across firms within the 
same industry, or between firms and industries across the entire nation. The implica-
tions are rather clear cut: Wages are compressed over the bargaining unit. Thus, when 
wages are determined at the firm level, unions compress the distribution of wages within 
the firm. When wages are set at the industry level, unions compress the distribution of 
wages across firms within the industry. When wages are set at the national level, unions 
compress the distribution of wages across firms, industries, and occupations throughout 
the entire nation. 
The gains from coordination tend to be distributed according to fairness norms. 
The resulting pattern is therefore that more coordination is associated with less wage 
inequality, implying that the level of wage coordination determines both the size of the 
gains and the units over which the fairness norms are applied. 
Part of the coordination gains from unionized labor markets is a reduction of the 
possibility of employers to excise monopsony power over low-paid workers. The iso-
lated impacts are to raise both wages and employment. Hence, by raising these low 
wages, equality goes up together with employment levels. Further coordination across 
firms weakens employers’ monopsony power even more.
Moving wage coordination from the firm level to the industry level means that 
the union association becomes stronger as it is more comprehensive and organizes all 
competing workers. The association would therefore be able to pose more aggressive 
wage demands as its effective monopoly power would increase. Yet, the association 
would not be comprehensive enough to internalize all externalities in wage setting. 
The result is therefore a higher average wage, reduced profitability, and lower invest-
ment. The decline in investments is in turn likely to reduce the demand for other 
types of workers. All in all, the end result might be more wage equality and lower 
employment. 
Further coordination, across industries and across different types of workers, 
has different implications. It implies that the wage setting would be coordinated 
between workers who are complements in total production, implying that the de-
mand for all workers involved would move in tandem. Coordination of wage setting 
among workers who are complements therefore leads to wage moderation and em-
ployment expansion. The highest wages are held back more than the lowest wages. In 
addition, all coordination across industries reduces the ability of union leaders 
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to pass on higher wage costs to market prices for goods that their members do not 
consume.
Paradoxically, therefore, a strong and comprehensive union association has less ef-
fective monopoly power than a less comprehensive association. Wage moderation results 
since coordination in wage bargaining internalizes more of the externalities including 
the total employment effects of wage restraint.1 
If all this is right, the variation created on employment and wage inequality by alter-
ing the level of coordination is not monotonic. Starting from a low level, more coordina-
tion tends to yield higher wage inequality and less employment. Further coordination, 
however, implies more wage equality and higher employment levels. There might also be 
grey areas of more mixed results depending on the presence of monopsony power and on 
which groups coordinate their wages – whether coordination takes place among high- or 
low-paid workers. 
The message 
The clearest message from our theoretical review is the importance of distinguishing be-
tween one-sided and two-sided wage compression. While wage compression from below 
is likely to reduce employment, wage compression from both sides is likely to increase 
employment. In addition, monopsony may matter. If compression is associated with less 
exercised monopsony power, we expect a positive correlation between employment and 
wage equality. 
So again, it is important how wage inequality in fact is reduced – whether it is 
through union bargaining that only sets a floor on the lowest wages or whether it is 
through wage coordination across unions that raises the bottom and restrains the top. 
Or is more wage equality basically a result of other interventions that curb the exercised 
monopsony power of employers? 
In addition, we need to consider how wage equality affects the supply of labor and 
in particular the discrete choice whether to participate, or not, in the active labor force. 
When lowest wages are raised, all else being the same, one should expect a stronger will-
ingness to participate in the labor force by people with low qualifications, irrespective of 
whether the compression is one sided or two sided. 
Let us now turn to what the data can tell us. We use data on employment, 
labor market attachment, unemployment, and wage inequality from 22 countries over 
22 years,2 for the most part obtained through the Organization of Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD). 
1 A related issue has been studied in the literature, emphasizing how the relationship between succes-
sive coordination and the wage demands by workers is likely to be first increasing and then decreasing. 
Calmfors and Driffill (1988), Freeman (1988), and Moene et al. (1993) argue that the relationship 
between centralization and economic performance is hump-shaped rather than monotonic. According to 
their view, countries with either highly centralized or decentralized wage setting should do better than 
those in an intermediate position. But the empirical support for the hump shape is not crystal clear. 
2 See Appendix I for a detailed description of the data. 
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Employment population rates
As is apparent from the discussion above, it is likely that there are several mechanisms at 
play at the same time. We are unable to provide a causal analysis of the relative impact of 
each of these mechanisms. What we do provide, however, is a descriptive analysis of the 
empirical relationship between the two variables along various cuts and dimensions. 
Our argument is simple: If the relationship between wage equality and employ-
ment rates, conditional on various other factors, remains positive, the mechanisms un-
derscored by the skeptics are either empirically not present or not strong enough to 
determine employment rates. Furthermore, if the arguments of the skeptics dominate 
empirically, we expect higher sensitivity to equality, particularly among marginal groups 
in the labor market. We organize the bits and pieces of evidence in separate descriptive 
claims. 
Employment is not lower in countries with high equality 
We use the employment population ratio as a measure of labor demand. If the skeptics 
toward equality are right, we expect to find a positive correlation between wage in-
equality and employment rates. If the skeptics are right, however, we expect to find that 
marginal groups, groups with lower skills and wages, have relatively lower employment 
rates in countries with a compressed wage structure. These are the groups that should 
face poorer employment opportunities when wages at the bottom of the distribution are 
too high. 
As a first illustration, consider 2007, the last year before the financial crisis. How 
the different economies dealt with the crisis and recovery may show up in employment 
and wages in ways that are highly interesting, but that may be unrelated to the more 
basic discussion of wage equality and employment. The description of the OECD coun-
tries given below shows a rather robust pattern where employment rates are particular 
high in the Scandinavian countries with the smallest wage differences. The data we use 
are described in the appendix, where we also provide a set of summary tables for all the 
OECD countries. 
Vulnerable age groups are not underemployed
Consider first the employment rates of various demographic groups with different levels 
of labor market attachment: Youth and the elderly of both sexes, and the overall employ-
ment rate of men and women between 15 and 64 years. Figure 2 shows the employment 
rates for a few countries as an illustration. We have picked the USA and the UK as repre-
senting the most flexible relative wage regimes; France, Spain, and Italy as representing 
the middle ground; and the Scandinavian countries as representing the wage-compressed 
regime. The numbers for all countries are reported in Appendix Table A1. 
Figure 2 shows on the x-axis the OECD average employment ratio for the different 
demographic groups. The young have the lowest employment rates. On the y-axis we 
show the performance of the different countries. Points above the 45° line show coun-
tries with above-average employment rates, and points below show countries below the 
14 Employment as a Price or a Prize of Equality Erling Barth and Karl Ove Moene
average. We find the Scandinavian countries at the top, together with the USA and the 
UK, with France, Spain, and Italy below the average (see also Faggio and Nickell, 2006). 
Even among the groups with lower labor market attachment, the wage-compressed 
countries score very high. 
Employment rates for young people are affected by the number of students. In 
countries with high educational attainment, employment–population rates are lower. We 
have thus calculated employment rates for young people who do not report studying as 
their main activity. Figure 3 shows employment rates both for young men (20–24 years 
of age) and for those who are not students, using data from the European Social Survey. 
We find Norway high up, with employment rates above 70 percent for young men and 
with close to 90 percent for non-students. Denmark and Sweden have high numbers as 
well. Even though these numbers are taken from smaller surveys than the labor force 
surveys used by the OECD, and the numbers are thus more uncertain, the picture is 
clear: The employment rates of the Scandinavian countries are very high, even for youth. 
The figures for young women (not shown) are even more striking. 
Workers with low education seem not to be excluded 
Figure 4 shows similar figures of employment rates as figure 2, but now for individu-

























Figure 2: Employment–population ratios, demographic groups.
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics, see Appendix Table A1. 
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Figure 3: Employment rates for young and for non-students.
Source: Own calculations on European Social Surveys, 2008. Non-students are defined as persons in the relevant age 

























Figure 4: Employment–population ratios, levels of education.
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schooling. Figures for all the OECD countries are reported in Appendix Table A2. 
Looking at Figure 4, we find that the employment rates are rising in the level of 
education. Again, we find the Scandinavian countries among the top in all catego-
ries, even in the groups with the lowest level of education (below upper secondary 
schooling). 
Relative employment rates are also high where equality is high
These figures are striking. However, a host of different factors may influence employ-
ment rates, other than relative wages. In this section, we present figures for relative 
employment rates instead of absolute rates. Consider first the demographic groups. 
Table 1 provides the ratio of the employment rate of a given group relative to the em-
ployment rate of prime age males in the same country; this relative measure may provide 
a more relevant test of the hypothesis that relative wages affect relative employment. 
Among all groups, the Scandinavian countries have higher relative employment rates 
than the OECD average, and for most groups, the numbers are also higher than for the 
flexible relative wage countries, the UK and the USA. The exception is Swedish young 
men, who have low relative employment ratio. 
We do the same exercise for educational groups, now measuring the employment 
rates of low-skilled workers relative to high-skilled workers. The figures are given in 
Table 2. The pattern here is clear. The Scandinavian countries have at least as high 
relative employment rates as the USA and the UK. For low education, the relative 
employment rates are considerably higher than the OECD average. 
We have so far made comparison across countries in one year – 2007. This may 
be a peculiar year, and the pattern may look different at other times, for instance if the 
different countries react differently to the business cycle. Let us thus now turn to a com-
parison of employment patterns over time across a panel of countries. 
Table 1  Relative employment rates for different demographic groups, 2007.
Relative employment rate relative to prime age men Empl./pop. %
Men 1524 Men 5564 Women 1524 Women 5564 Women 2554 Men 2554
Denmark 0.74 0.72 0.71 0.58 0.91 90.2
Norway 0.61 0.83 0.63 0.72 0.92 89.2
Sweden 0.52 0.82 0.52 0.75 0.93 89.0
The USA 0.62 0.77 0.59 0.65 0.83 87.5
The UK 0.65 0.75 0.62 0.55 0.85 88.3
OECD avg 0.54 0.73 0.45 0.50 0.75 88.0
France 0.37 0.46 0.31 0.41 0.86 88.3
Spain 0.55 0.68 0.42 0.34 0.75 87.6
Italy 0.34 0.52 0.22 0.26 0.68 87.3
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics, extracted from the OECD ilibrary.
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Panel analyses confirm the negative relationship between  
employment and inequality
We use observations from the 22 countries over more than 20 years to check if the main 
impression from the cross-country comparison above is maintained when including a 
host of controls that may influence employment rates. We use simple regression models 
of employment rates on wage inequality, including both year and country fixed effects. 
A positive coefficient for wage inequality suggests that the skeptics are right, whereas a 
negative coefficient shows that the main pattern displayed above is maintained. 
Table 3 provides the results. The dependent variable is ln (employment population 
ratio). The first column shows a specification with year dummies only. The elasticity of 
employment with respect to wage inequality is measured to −0.1, displaying a negative 
Table 2  Relative employment rates by educational group (25–64), 2007.
Low Medium Tertiary
Relative employment rate relative to tertiary Empl. pop. %
Denmark 0.76 0.94 87.8
Norway 0.73 0.93 90.4
Sweden 0.75 0.94 88.6
The USA 0.70 0.88 83.3
The UK 0.74 0.92 87.8
OECD avg 0.69 0.90 84.6
France 0.69 0.91 83.5
Spain 0.72 0.90 84.4
Italy 0.66 0.93 80.2
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics, extracted from the OECD ilibrary.







Wage inequality (ln d9d1) −0.1089*** −0.0938** −0.2591***
(0.0241) (0.0318) (0.0405)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes
Fixed country effects Yes
N 322 322 322
Note: Dependent variable, ln(employment population rate, ages 15–64 years). Number of countries, 22. Years: 1985–2007. 
Covariates include the share of tertiary education, an index of employment protection, the tax wedge, public expenditures 
on active labor market measures, union density, and public social expenditures. Level of significance (***) 1 pct, (**) 5 pct, 
and (*) 10 pct. See Appendix 1 for details on the data. 
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pattern. In model 2, we add several covariates to the analysis: the share of tertiary edu-
cation, an index of employment protection, public expenditures on active labor market 
measures, union density, the tax wedge, and public social expenditures.3 The coefficient 
is still negative at −0.09.
A host of country-specific factors may affect both employment rates and wage in-
equality. In model 3, we show that the negative relationship between wage inequal-
ity and employment rates shows up even when we identify the relationship based on 
within-country differences only, including control for the other covariates. The elasticity 
is now measured to −0.26. Note that this relationship is estimated using within-country 
variation in wage inequality, and all constant country-specific attributes, such as history, 
climate, or natural resources, are swept out of the analysis. 
Coordination of bargaining is associated with higher employment
As discussed, both bargaining coordination and high levels of welfare generosity may 
induce wage compression (see Barth and Moene 2011). In this section, we introduce 
measures of both into the regression framework in order to check if the observed rela-
tionship between wage inequality and employment rates mainly arises from the underly-
ing institutional factors or from wage compression per se. 
Table 4 reports the regression models for a sample of country years where we also 
have reliable measures of welfare generosity and bargaining coordination (Sample 2 
3 Most of the data are extracted from the OECD ilibrary. See Appendix 1 for details.













Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Fixed country effects Yes Yes
N 178 178 178
Note: Dependent variable, ln(employment population rate, age 15–64 years). Number of countries, 14. Years: 1985–2002. 
Covariates include the share of tertiary education, the tax wedge, an index of employment protection, public expendi-
tures on active labor market measures, union density, and public social expenditures. Level of significance (***) 1 pct, (**) 
5 pct, and (*) 10 pct. See Appendix 1 for details on the data. 
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of 14 countries from 1985 to 2002, see data appendix for details). We first establish 
that there is also a negative correlation in these data. When we introduce country fixed 
effects, the coefficient for wage inequality becomes smaller, but it is still highly signifi-
cant. In model 3, we find that both welfare generosity and bargaining coordination show 
up with positive coefficients. Both of these institutions have a wage compressing effect, 
and some of the negative correlation between wage inequality and employment is due 
to this effect. The coefficient for wage inequality has dropped by one-half, but remains 
negative, even though it is no longer statistically significant. The results clearly offer no 
support to the view that wage compression is detrimental to employment. 
The results confirm a positive relationship between bargaining coordination and 
employment, as we would expect, and a more surprising positive relationship between 
welfare generosity and employment. Note, however, that these results reflect partial cor-
relations and need not have a causal interpretation. 
Labor force participation rates and unemployment 
Does equality lead to low labor force participation? We offer a description that indicates 
that there is a positive relationship between wage equality and participation. Hence, 
contrary to the skeptics’ views, mechanisms that induce more equality seem not to pre-
vent people from participating in the formal work. Or, in other words, the circumstances 
that benefit wage equality do not seem to directly hamper labor force participation. 
Participation rates are not lower in countries with high equality 
High employment rates show that employers are willing to employ a large part of the 
population at any given time. Another requirement is that a large part of the population is 
willing to work under the current conditions. The skeptics of equality would argue that a 
compressed wage structure, in particular arising from a generous welfare state, would limit 
labor supply. This effect should be most pronounced for groups that are at the margin of 
labor force attendance, especially at the bottom of the wage distribution. The defenders 
would argue that a compressed wage structure provides people with incentives to work, 
especially at the bottom of the wage distribution, since this is where wages are higher. As we 
show below, it turns out that labor supply is high in countries with low wage dispersion. 
Participation rates for vulnerable groups are also high in countries with  
high equality 
Table 5 shows that participation is high in Scandinavia also for sub-groups. However, 
the numbers are not as distinct for all the different groups as they were for employment. 
In particular, the number for prime age men, an average of 92.1 for the Scandinavian 
countries, is slightly below the average for EU 15 of 92.8. Still, this difference is hardly 
sufficient to substantiate a claim that wage inequality or the welfare state of the Scan-
dinavian countries limits labor supply. The labor supply of the young, and the old, is 
among the top in the OECD.
20 Employment as a Price or a Prize of Equality Erling Barth and Karl Ove Moene
Table 6 shows results from similar regression models of labor force participation as we 
used for employment. We find very similar results to those concerning employment, with 
somewhat smaller coefficients for wage inequality. However, while bargaining coordi-
nation was correlated with employment, this is not the case for participation. Welfare 
generosity, in contrast, is clearly positively correlated with labor force participation rates. 
The coefficient for wage inequality is somewhat smaller than it was for employ-
ment rates, but it is still significantly negative and rather large in size. The last bottom 
column shows that there is a negative, but not statistically significant relationship 
between labor supply and wage inequality, conditional on bargaining coordination 
and welfare generosity even when identified using within-country variation only.
High participation and low wage inequality are not associated with  
high unemployment
One could think that high participation in the labor force would create high unemployment 
unless wages are flexible and unequal enough to generate full employment. Yet, in spite of 
Scandinavian wage compression and perhaps lower flexibility, both the overall unemploy-
ment rates and those for different demographic groups are lower in Scandinavia than in 
most other countries (see, e.g., Nickell et al. 2005 and Faggio and Nickell, 2006). The ex-
ception to this pattern is young people in Sweden who experience very high unemployment 
rates (Figure 5). Table A4 in the appendix gives numbers for all OECD countries. 
Relative unemployment rates indicate that Scandinavia is more similar  
to other countries
When we look at relative unemployment rates, for instance, the rate of young unem-
ployed to the rates of prime age men, the picture is more mixed. Table 7 reports the 
Table 5  Labor market participation for different demographic groups, 2007.
Participation rates relative to prime age men Part./Pop. 
rate %
Men 1524 Men 5465 Women 1524 Women 5564 Women 2554 Men 2554
Denmark 0.78 0.72 0.75 0.59 0.92 92.5
Norway 0.65 0.82 0.66 0.71 0.92 90.9
Sweden 0.61 0.82 0.62 0.75 0.94 92.9
The USA 0.68 0.77 0.63 0.64 0.83 90.9
The UK 0.74 0.75 0.68 0.55 0.85 91.6
OECD avg 0.58 0.72 0.48 0.49 0.76 92.2
France 0.43 0.45 0.36 0.40 0.88 94.2
Spain 0.62 0.68 0.51 0.35 0.78 92.6
Italy 0.40 0.51 0.28 0.26 0.70 91.0
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics, extracted from the OECD ilibrary
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Table 6  Labor force participation rates 15–64 years.
Without fixed country effects
Wage inequality (ln d9d1) −0.0276 −0.1995*** −0.2006***
(0.0274) (0.0558) (0.0726)
Welfare generosity 0.1668** 0.1288*
(0.0673) (0.0671)
Bargaining coordination 0.0100 -0.0070
(0.0078) (.0096)
With fixed country effects
Wage inequality (ln d9d1) −0.1296*** −0.1000** −0.0404
(0.0271) (0.0466) (0.0482)
Welfare generosity 0.1586*** 0.1540***
 (0.0453) (0.0457)




# of countries 22 14
N 322 178
Note: Dependent variable: ln(participation rate). All models include control for fixed year effects, the share of tertiary 
education, the tax wedge, an index of employment protection, public expenditures on active labor market measures, 
union density, and public social expenditures. Level of significance (***) 1 pct, (**) 5 pct, and (*) 10 pct. 
results. Now we find that the Scandinavian countries look more like the USA and the UK 
and have higher relative unemployment rates than the OECD average. 
Turning to an educational grouping, the picture switches back to one that is fa-
vorable for the Scandinavian model. The unemployment ratios between high and low 
education are favorable for high education groups, and there is more variation between 
the Scandinavian countries in unemployment rates. Perhaps surprisingly, all the Nordic 
countries have a smaller ratio between the unemployment rates of low-educated work-
ers and high-educated workers than both the USA and the UK, countries with high wage 
inequality and flexible wages (Table 8). 
Concluding remarks 
Above, we have focused most on the link from wage equality to employment. We do 
not find indications in the data that low employment rate constitutes the price of wage 
equality. On the contrary, our descriptive analysis indicates that there is a positive and 
robust association between wage equality and employment: a prize of wage equality. 
This pattern in the data seems inconsistent with the assertion of the skeptics that wage 
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Table 7  Relative unemployment rates for different demographic groups, 2007.
Men 1524 Men 5465 Women 1524 Women 5564 Women 2554 Men 2554
Relative unemployment rate relative to prime age men Unempl. 
rate %
Denmark 3.21 1.20 2.91 1.59 1.36 2.6
Norway 4.16 0.59 3.49 0.44 1.04 1.9
Sweden 4.46 1.05 4.72 0.85 1.15 4.1
The USA 3.13 0.87 2.56 0.81 1.03 3.7
The UK 4.31 1.12 3.42 0.59 1.01 3.7
OECD avg 2.64 0.91 2.53 0.80 1.15 4.6
France 2.86 0.85 3.12 0.78 1.22 6.3
Spain 2.81 0.90 4.05 1.42 1.78 5.4
Italy 4.51 0.64 5.77 0.52 1.76 4.0
























Figure 5:  Unemployment rates, demographic groups.
compression forces low-paid workers out of their jobs and eventually over to welfare 
programs. 
Throughout we have emphasized that the regression models presented above 
are descriptive. Causation is a separate issue and it can go both ways. Consider the 
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following simple example where employment rates become higher for some unobserved 
reason, say high international demand for the country’s goods. In that case, marginal 
workers are pulled into the labor force, and since they are likely to be pulled from the 
lower end of the skills distribution, their inclusion affects the wage distribution. In other 
words, in this case the wage distribution is determined by the employment rate and not 
vice versa. 
This reverse causality is of course a possible story. Note, however, that if this is the 
case, we would expect a positive relationship between wage inequality and employment, 
and not the negative effect that we have found. An ordinary least square regression in 
the case of an endogenous regressor comes up with an estimator that is a weighted aver-
age of the two effects. So what we have found is an attenuated measure, not an exagger-
ated one: What we have provided in that case is a conservative measure of the effect of 
wage inequality on employment. Of course, it is possible to construct other stories that 
would support a causal relationship going from employment to wage dispersion, and we 
do not claim that our results are able to sort these out. All in all, we are thus reluctant to 
conclude strongly with respect to the mechanisms that drive our results.
We have also demonstrated some further regularities, or correlations, that are worth 
considering. For instance, we find a positive correlation between the generosity of the 
welfare state and labor force participation. This is contrary to what many people think. 
With the link between participation and employment, it may also have clear implica-
tions for the association between welfare generosity and employment. 
Here we can only speculate about the possible causes for the positive associations. 
One thought is that the design of the welfare state favors people with a job. To have a 
job gives them rights to future benefits. In addition, higher minimum wages give peo-
ple incentives to work, even when the welfare state provides a generous floor. In the 
Scandinavian countries, eligibility and the generosity of social insurance and welfare 
benefits are to a large extent conditioned on labor income. Social insurance benefits 
thus actually add to the value of the wage, in particular for groups with higher risk. 
Examples are disability benefits, unemployment benefits, and maternity leave, all add-
ing to work incentives. In sum, the Scandinavian welfare states have for long practiced 
rules that tie welfare benefits to having (had) a job (“arbeidslinjen”), implying that the 
Table 8  Relative unemployment rates, lower versus tertiary, ratio 2007.
Lower/Tertiary Upper Secondary/Tertiary Tertiary u-rate %
Denmark 1.42 0.86 2.95
Norway 2.33 0.93 1.40
Sweden 2.07 1.25 3.37
The USA 4.01 2.14 2.11
The UK 2.86 1.74 2.27
OECD avg 2.62 1.44 3.40
France 2.11 1.23 4.86
Spain 1.87 1.42 4.81
Italy 1.51 0.99 4.18
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics, extracted from the OECD ilibrary.
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generosity of the welfare state may also provide strong incentives to participate in the 
labor market.
Also, high employment levels are more important for the politics of the welfare state 
than it is for economies where a larger part of social insurance is provided inside the 
family. This may perhaps be why we see such a strong focus on activation policies and 
activation measures in social policy in the countries where the risk is diffused through a 
public insurance system rather than through the family system.
Another thought is that there might be a reverse causality between generosity and 
labor force participation. It might not be a generous welfare state that fuels labor partici-
pation, but rather the high employment rates that fuel generosity. Two mechanisms might 
be important. High employment rates fuel demand for social insurance, not only because 
it is a normal good (Barth and Moene 2011) but also because it becomes cheaper. The 
fewer people that need to use the system, relative to the employed population, the less 
expensive it is per employed to provide the taxes necessary for higher generosity. 
Finally, we have also shown that countries with more egalitarian wage structure 
tend to have lower unemployment, in several cases, even low relative unemployment for 
the low wage groups. As hinted to one important reason might be coordination in bar-
gaining combined with active labor market measures. Wage coordination leads to both 
wage compression and low unemployment. The reason is likely to be that coordination 
in bargaining internalizes externalities across complements in production. 
Features like these were much more discussed in the 1980s and were made famous 
in the book by Layard et al. (1991). Ten years later, even the OECD (2006) recognizes 
the positive unemployment performance of countries with a combination of coordinated 
bargaining and active labor market policies. Perhaps we now will see a revival of the 
emphasis of these arrangements as a system of risk sharing that spreads the costs of 
international fluctuations to the whole labor market?
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Appendix I Data
All covariates Generosity and 
Coord.
Wage inequality




Australia 1997–2007 1997–2002 1997–2007
Austria 1994–2001, 
2004–2007





















Finland 1986–2007 1986–2002 1996–2001 1986–2007
France 1994–2007 1994–2002 1994–2001 1994–2007
Germany 1991–2007 1991–2002 1991–2007
Greece 1994–1997 . 1994–2001 2004–2007
Italy 2004–2007 . 2004–2007
Japan 1990–2007 1990–2002 1990–2007
Korea 2000–2007 . 2000–2007






Poland 1997, 2007 . 1997–2007
Portugal 1985, 1989, 
1991–2001, 
2004–2007






. 1994–2001 1995, 2002, 
2004–2007
Sweden 1985–2007 1985–2002 1985–2004, 
1990–2007











United States 1985–2007 1985–2002 1985–2007
Note: country not included in Sample 2. 
Employment and labor force participation are defined in percent of population in the 
relevant age group. Unemployment rate is defined as percent of labor force in relevant 
age group. Data from the OECD Labor Force Statistics, 1985–2007, extracted from the 
OECD iLibrary. 
Wage inequality is defined as d9/d1 of gross hourly wage and is for the most part 
taken from the OECD earnings database, extracted from the OECD ilibrary. Addi-
tional data are from the OECD Employment Outlook 1996 (1985–1994) and from 
ECHP (1995–2001). See Table A1 for details. Indicator variables are included in the 
analysis to control for data source when data are taken from ECHP (including a time 
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Iceland 85.7 74.3 84.9 84.1 94.2
Switzerland 78.6 62.6 67.2 78.5 93.6
Denmark 77.1 65.3 58.6 82.4 90.2
Norway 76.9 55.1 69.0 82.3 89.2
Sweden 75.7 46.3 70.1 83.0 89.0
New Zealand 75.2 58.2 71.8 74.3 90.1
The Netherlands 74.8 68.2 48.3 77.6 91.3
Canada 73.6 59.5 57.1 78.2 86.2
Australia 72.8 64.1 56.6 71.9 88.1
United Kingdom 72.3 55.9 57.4 74.7 88.3
United States 71.8 53.1 61.8 72.5 87.5
Austria 71.4 55.5 38.6 77.5 90.6
Japan 70.7 41.4 66.1 67.4 92.8
Finland 70.5 46.4 55.0 80.7 85.9
G7 countries 69.7 46.9 56.7 71.5 88.3
North America 69.4 50.8 60.3 67.9 88.5
Estonia 69.4 34.5 60.0 80.1 89.7
Oceania 69.3 40.7 64.4 66.1 90.7
Ireland 69.2 49.8 54.2 69.6 87.8
Germany 69.0 45.9 51.3 74.0 86.4
Russian Federation 68.1 34.8 48.4 82.2 86.7
Portugal 67.8 34.9 50.9 74.9 87.2
Slovenia 67.8 37.6 33.5 82.4 88.1
European Union 15 67.0 41.6 46.4 71.3 87.8
Spain 66.6 42.9 44.6 65.6 87.6
OECD countries 66.5 43.2 53.5 66.3 88.0
Czech Republic 66.1 28.5 46.0 74.9 91.7
European Union 19 65.8 38.9 44.6 71.1 87.2
Luxemburg 64.2 22.5 32.0 71.7 92.2
France 64.0 30.1 38.3 76.1 88.3
Korea 63.9 25.7 60.6 60.5 87.3
Europe 63.4 37.9 43.8 65.5 86.4
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interaction), for Austria, Greece, and Portugal before 2002 and for annual data when 
reported. 
Generosity of the welfare state is measured by the overall generosity index provided in 
the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset, constructed and generously made available 
for other researchers by Lyle Scruggs at the University of Connecticut. The index captures 
the generosity of income support in the case of illness, of unemployment, and of disability 
pensions (including old age) of each country year cell. Generosity is constructed using the 
replacement ratio, coverage, entitlements, and timing of different schemes, in addition to 
other features of the schemes. The construction of the index is described in Scruggs (2004, 
2007). The data set is available at http://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/wp.htm 
Coordination in bargaining is defined as the 10-year average of (present and lagged) 
bargaining level 2 from Golden et al. (2006). Bargaining level 2 is the level at which 
wages are determined, coded as follows (2001–2002 values of bargaining level 2 are set 
at 2000 values): 
1 = plant-level wage setting
2 = industry-level wage setting without sanctions
3 = industry-level wage setting with sanctions
4 = central wage setting without sanctions
5 = central wage setting with sanctions
Tax wedge is calculated for one-earner married couple at average earnings, 2 children, 
and is taken from the OECD Taxation Data, historical rates 1985–2004, comparative 
tables 2005–2007, extracted from the OECD iLibrary. When historical rates report 
data every other year, the average is used for the year in between. Differences between 
the two series (historical rates and comparative rates) are adjusted using the ratio of 
the average reported rate from each source for the overlapping years 2000–2004 for 
each country. Public expenditure on labor-marked programs is taken from the OECD 
Labor Market Programs DataBase, 1985–2007, extracted from the OECD ilibrary. 
Union density is taken from the OECD Trade Union Data, 1985–2007, extracted 
Belgium 62.0 27.5 34.4 72.3 87.0
Greece 61.4 24.0 42.4 60.8 90.1
Mexico 61.1 44.2 54.7 51.0 92.9
Slovak Republic 60.7 27.6 35.7 71.0 85.0
Israel 58.9 27.2 57.2 67.1 78.9
Italy 58.7 24.7 33.8 59.6 87.3
Hungary 57.3 21.0 33.1 67.9 81.3
Poland 57.0 25.8 29.7 68.8 81.1
Chile 56.3 26.4 54.4 50.6 89.0
Turkey 44.6 30.2 27.1 25.6 80.7
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics, extracted from the OECD ilibrary. Sorted by employment population ratio 15–64 years.
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Table A2 Employment population rates, by educational group, percent 2007. 
Ratio
Country Below upper  
secondary
Upper secondary Tertiary Below/Tertiary
Iceland 84.1 88.6 92.2 0.91
Switzerland 66.0 81.1 90.0 0.73
Denmark 66.6 82.5 87.8 0.76
Norway 66.3 84.0 90.4 0.73
Sweden 66.6 83.1 88.6 0.75
New Zealand 71.0 84.6 83.7 0.85
The Netherlands 61.9 80.3 87.7 0.71
Canada 57.3 76.5 82.9 0.69
Australia 63.9 80.5 84.8 0.75
United Kingdom 64.9 80.9 87.8 0.74
United States 58.3 73.6 83.3 0.70
Austria 57.9 76.9 86.8 0.67
Japan 74.4 80.1
Finland 58.6 76.2 85.2 0.69
Ireland 58.7 77.1 86.7 0.68
Germany 54.6 74.4 85.5 0.64
Portugal 71.6 79.8 85.9 0.83
Spain 60.5 76.3 84.4 0.72
Czech Republic 45.7 76.1 85.2 0.54
Luxemburg 62.3 73.9 84.5 0.74
France 57.8 75.8 83.5 0.69
Korea 66.0 70.7 77.2 0.86
Belgium 49.8 74.2 84.9 0.59
Greece 59.9 69.4 82.6 0.73
from the OECD ilibrary. The percent of population with tertiary education from 1990 
to 2007 is taken from the OECD Education at a Glance, various years (linearized 
when missing and for 2007). From 1985 to 1989, education data are imputed using 
linearized values of five years figures reported in De la Fuente and Domenech (2002). 
Employment protection is defined as Overall employment protection legislation index, 
version 1, 1985–2007, extracted from the OECD ilibrary. Public social expenditure is 
defined as total social public spending per capita and is taken from the OECD Social 
expenditure database, 1985–2007, extracted from the OECD ilibrary. 
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Table A3 Labor force participation rates, percent 2007.
Women Men










Iceland 87.8 80.1 85.7 85.4 95.3
Switzerland 81.6 67.4 69.3 81.9 95.8
Sweden 80.6 57.1 73.0 87.1 92.9
Denmark 80.2 70.9 60.8 85.4 92.5
Norway 78.9 59.4 69.7 84.0 90.9
Canada 78.4 67.0 60.1 82.1 91.1
New Zealand 78.1 64.7 72.9 76.6 92.1
The Netherlands 77.5 72.8 50.4 80.3 93.3
United Kingdom 76.3 65.3 59.3 77.6 91.6
Australia 76.2 70.8 58.2 74.8 90.8
Finland 75.7 55.0 58.8 85.6 90.3
Germany 75.6 52.0 57.2 80.6 93.8
United States 75.3 59.4 63.8 75.4 90.9
Austria 74.7 60.8 39.8 81.1 93.7
Portugal 74.1 41.9 54.4 82.8 92.8
G7 countries 73.7 53.1 59.2 75.2 92.5
Japan 73.6 44.9 68.4 70.1 96.3
Estonia 72.9 38.3 62.2 83.7 93.6
North America 72.7 56.1 62.2 70.5 91.8
Ireland 72.6 55.4 55.4 72.2 91.6
Spain 72.6 52.4 47.4 72.7 92.6
Russian Federation 72.5 40.6 49.9 86.4 91.6
European Union 15 72.1 48.8 49.2 76.7 92.8
Mexico 63.0 73.5 83.0 0.76
Slovak Republic 29.1 73.2 84.2 0.35
Italy 52.8 74.5 80.2 0.66
Hungary 38.5 70.2 80.4 0.48
Poland 41.0 65.2 84.5 0.49
Turkey 46.9 61.0 74.6 0.63
Source: OECD Factbook 2010: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics – OECDAge group 25–64 years. Sorted by 
employment population ratio 15–64 years (Table 1).
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Oceania 72.1 44.4 66.5 68.5 94.0
Slovenia 71.3 41.8 34.6 87.3 91.3
European Union 19 71.0 46.0 47.3 76.7 92.3
OECD countries 70.6 49.1 55.7 70.0 92.2
Czech Republic 69.8 31.9 48.2 80.3 95.0
France 69.5 37.0 40.4 82.4 94.2
Europe 68.5 45.0 46.4 70.6 91.8
Slovak Republic 68.2 34.5 38.8 80.5 93.0
Belgium 67.1 33.9 35.9 78.0 92.5
Greece 67.0 31.1 43.9 69.1 94.6
Luxemburg 66.9 26.5 32.7 74.7 94.9
Korea 66.2 28.2 62.0 62.0 90.5
Israel 63.7 32.4 60.4 72.0 83.7
Mexico 63.3 47.4 55.6 52.6 95.3
Poland 63.2 33.0 31.8 75.6 87.9
Italy 62.5 30.9 34.6 64.1 91.0
Hungary 61.9 25.6 34.5 73.2 86.9
Chile 60.8 32.1 56.5 54.6 93.9
Turkey 49.8 37.7 28.3 28.0 88.1
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics, extracted from the OECD ilibrary. Sorted by labor force participation rates 15–64 
years.
Table A4 Unemployment rates, percent 2007.
Women Men










Iceland 2.3 7.2 0.9 1.6 1.2
Norway 2.6 7.3 1.0 2.0 1.9
Korea 3.4 8.8 2.2 2.4 3.6
The Netherlands 3.5 6.3 4.2 3.4 2.1
Mexico 3.5 6.7 1.6 3.1 2.5
Switzerland 3.7 7.1 3.1 4.1 2.3
New Zealand 3.8 10.1 1.5 3.0 2.2
Denmark 3.8 7.9 3.5 3.5 2.6
Oceania 3.9 8.3 3.1 3.5 3.5
Japan 4.1 7.7 3.4 3.9 3.6
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Luxemburg 4.1 15.2 2.1 4.0 2.8
Australia 4.4 9.4 2.7 3.9 2.9
Austria 4.5 8.7 3.0 4.5 3.3
North America 4.6 9.6 3.0 3.8 3.6
United States 4.7 10.5 3.1 3.8 3.7
Ireland 4.7 10.0 2.2 3.6 4.2
Estonia 4.8 10.0 3.5 4.3 4.2
Slovenia 5.0 10.1 3.3 5.6 3.4
United Kingdom 5.3 14.4 3.3 3.7 3.7
Czech Republic 5.4 10.7 4.6 6.7 3.5
G7 countries 5.5 11.6 4.1 5.0 4.5
OECD countries 5.8 12.0 4.0 5.3 4.6
Canada 6.1 11.2 5.0 4.7 5.3
Russian Federation 6.1 14.4 3.0 4.9 5.4
Sweden 6.2 18.9 3.9 4.7 4.1
Italy 6.2 20.3 2.4 7.1 4.0
Finland 6.9 15.7 6.5 5.8 4.8
European Union 15 7.1 14.8 5.7 7.0 5.4
European Union 19 7.3 15.4 5.7 7.3 5.6
Chile 7.4 17.8 3.8 7.3 5.2
Israel 7.4 16.1 5.3 6.8 5.7
Hungary 7.4 18.0 4.2 7.2 6.5
Europe 7.5 15.8 5.5 7.2 5.8
Belgium 7.5 18.8 4.2 7.4 5.9
France 8.0 18.7 5.1 7.7 6.3
Spain 8.3 18.2 5.9 9.7 5.4
Greece 8.4 22.9 3.4 12.0 4.7
Portugal 8.5 16.6 6.5 9.6 6.1
Germany 8.7 11.7 10.3 8.1 7.8
Poland 9.7 21.7 6.8 9.1 7.8
Turkey 10.5 20.0 4.3 8.8 8.5
Slovak Republic 11.0 20.1 8.1 11.9 8.6
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics, extracted from the OECD ilibrary. Sorted by unemployment rate 15–64 years.
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Table A5 Unemployment rates, by educational group, percent 2007. 
Country Below upper secondary Upper secondary Tertiary Below/Tertiary ratio
Norway 3.3 1.3 1.4 2.33
Korea 2.4 3.3 2.9 0.81
The Netherlands 4.0 2.7 1.8 2.25
Mexico 2.2 2.8 3.6 0.62
Switzerland 6.7 3.0 2.1 3.17
New Zealand 3.1 2.0 2.2 1.39
Denmark 4.2 2.5 2.9 1.42
Japan 4.1 2.9
Luxemburg 4.1 2.8 3.0 1.39
Australia 5.1 3.0 2.2 2.31
Austria 7.4 3.3 2.4 3.10
United States 8.5 4.5 2.1 4.01
Ireland 6.1 3.5 2.3 2.64
United Kingdom 6.5 3.9 2.3 2.86
Canada 9.5 5.4 3.9 2.46
Sweden 7.0 4.2 3.4 2.07
Italy 6.3 4.1 4.2 1.51
Finland 8.9 6.1 3.6 2.49
Hungary 16.0 5.9 2.6 6.26
Belgium 11.3 6.2 3.3 3.44
France 10.2 6.0 4.9 2.11
Spain 9.0 6.8 4.8 1.87
Greece 7.0 8.2 6.1 1.16
Portugal 8.0 6.8 6.6 1.21
Germany 18.0 8.3 3.8 4.69
Poland 15.5 8.7 3.8 4.05
Turkey 8.6 9.1 6.8 1.26
Slovak Republic 41.3 8.5 3.3 12.59
Source: OECD Factbook 2010: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics – OECD. Age group 25–64 years. Sorted by 
unemployment rate 15–64 years.
 Nordic journal of working life studies Volume 2  ❚  Number 2  ❚  May 2012 33
References
Barth, Erling and Karl Ove Moene (2011) “The Equality Multiplier”. ESOP working paper, 
University of Oslo. 
Blau, Francine D. & Lawrence M. Kahn (2005) “Do Cognitive Test Scores Explain Higher 
U.S. Wage Inequality?,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 87(1): 184–193, MIT 
Press.
Calmfors, Lars and J. Driffill (1988) “Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconom-
ic Performance,” Economic Policy 6: 13–62.
Card, David and Alan B. Krueger (1995) Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of 
the Minimum Wage. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
De la Fuente Angel and Rafael Domenech (2006) “Human Capital in Growth Regressions: 
How Much Difference Does Data Quality Make?,” Journal of the European Economic 
Association 4(1): 1–36.
Faggio, Guilia and Stephen Nickell (2006) “Patterns of Work Across the OECD” CEPR 
discussion paper #730. 
Freeman, Richard (1988) “Labour Market Institutions and Economic Performance,” 
Economic Policy 3: 64–80.
Freeman, Richard and James Medoff (1984) What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books. 
Golden, Miriam, Peter Lange, and Michael Wallerstein (2006) “Union Centralization 
among Advanced Industrial Societies: An Empirical Study.” Dataset available at 
http://www.shelley.polisci.ucla.edu/
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) Unemployment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Manning, Alan (2003) Monopsony in Motion, Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Moene, Karl Ove & Wallerstein, Michael, (1997) “Pay Inequality,” Journal of Labor 
Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(3), pages 403–30, July
Moene, K. O., Michael Wallerstein, and Michael Hoel (1993) “Bargaining Structure and 
Economic Performance” in Flanagan, Moene and Wallerstein (eds) Trade Union 
Behaviour, Pay Bargaining and Economic Performance. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Nickell, Stephen, Luca Nunciata, and Wolfgang Ochel (2005) “Unemployment in the OECD 
since the 1960s. What do we know?,” The Economic Journal 115: 1–27.
OECD (2006) Employment Outlook 2006. 
OECD (2010) Sickness, Disability and Work: Breaking the Barriers: A Synthesis of Findings 
across OECD Countries. Paris: OECD Publishing.
